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JURISDICTION: CONFLICTS OF LAW AND THE
INDIAN RESERVATION: SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS
IN INDIAN CIVIL JURISDICTION
Kevin Gover
Jurisdiction over private civil disputes either arising on an Indian
reservation or involving Indians as parties has been the subject of
a great deal of case law covering a wide variety of situations. The
Supreme Court has brought order to the law in this area in such
cases as Williams v. Lee,' Kennerly v. District Court,2 and Fisher
v. District Court.'
However, several major issues remain unresolved by the Su-
preme Court decisions. Most are practical questions that arise as
a result of the special jurisdictional rules that apply to Indian
country. State courts and tribal governments are beginning to
resolve some of these problems, often employing standard con-
flict of laws theories. This note will review the current law in the
area, identify unresolved issues, and propose solutions suggested
by the current law and literature. Special attention will be paid to
familiar conflict of laws principles that can offer solutions to the
problems.
The Current Law on Indian Civil Jurisdiction
While there is a plethora of law in this area, the only complete-
ly reliable precedent comes from the Supreme Court.' There are
three cases in the modem era' that are the foundation for resolv-
ing questions in this area. The first is the landmark case of
Williams v. Lee, decided in 1959.6 In Williams, a non-Indian
trading post operator sued a Navajo Indian in state court on a
contract made on the reservation. The Supreme Court held that
state courts in Arizona had no jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter and that the Navajo Tribal Court was the exclusive forum for
adjudication of the case.7 The Court ruled that state jurisdiction
1. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
2. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
3. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
4. This is evidenced by the fact that all three of the Supreme Court decisions re-
versed state court determinations of the issues.
5. The "modern era" began with the case of Williams v. Lee, where the Court for
the first time acknowledged that the rule in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832), was no longer the law. The Worcester rule is discussed infra.
6. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
7. Id. at 223.
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in such a case would infringe on the Indians' right of self-
government.'
The next key case is Kennerly v. District Court.9 Kennerly in-
volved essentially the same facts as Williams. The Montana
Supreme Court ruled in Kennerly that because the Blackfoot
Tribal Council had passed a resolution purportedly granting
jurisdiction in civil disputes between Indians to the state, the state
courts therefore had jurisdiction over the subject matter. 0 The
Supreme Court disagreed, noting that a state could acquire such
jurisdiction only under the terms of Public Law 280.11 Since the
Montana legislature had not passed laws with regard to the
Blackfoot Reservation, 2 which complied with the requirements
of Public Law 280, the state courts had no jurisdiction regardless
of the action of the Blackfoot Tribal Council.' 3
The third Supreme Court decision in this area also involved an
appeal from the Montana Supreme Court. Fisher v. District
Court'4 arose from a state attempt to assert jurisdiction over a
child welfare case in which both the parents and the child were
Indians residing on the reservation. The Montana Supreme Court
again held in favor of the state and the United States Supreme
Court again reversed. The Court held, per curiam, that state
jurisdiction in such a case would infringe on tribal self-
government, and that the state was therefore without
jurisdiction." The Court also suggested that since the Northern
8. See the subsection on Torts and Contracts, infra.
9. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
10. Kennerly v. District Court, 154 Mont. 488, 466 P.2d 85 (1970).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976). Public Law 280, passed in 1953, gave
both civil and criminal jurisdiction to certain states and allowed other states, like Mon-
tana, to assert jurisdiction at their option. The law was amended in 1968 to require a vote
of the affected tribe approving the assertion of state jurisdiction.
12. Montana had passed a law assuming jurisdiction over Indians on the Flathead
Reservation. MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 83-801, 806 (1966).
13. The action of the tribal council came before the 1968 amendment to Public Law
280. 400 U.S. 423, 425 (1971).
14. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
15. "State court jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the powers of self-
government conferred upon the Northern Cheyenne Tribe .... It would subject a dispute
arising on the reservation among reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they
have established for themselves." Id. at 387-88.
It is unclear why the Court employed the infringement test. The Court first indicates
that the Williams test applies only where non-Indians are involved in the case, suggesting
that a different standard applies when all of the parties are Indians. The Court then said
that "since this litigation involves only Indians, at least the same standard must be met
before the state courts may exercise jurisdiction." Id. at 386. The Court then applied the




Cheyenne Tribe had assumed jurisdiction over such cases after
reorganizing under the terms of the Indian Reorganization Act,' 6
the state's jurisdiction was preempted by the tribal government. 7
While the Supreme Court decisions are less than clear in their
reasoning,' 8 they do provide guidelines for the division of auth-
ority between state and tribal courts. Tribal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over any civil dispute arising on the reservation where
the defendant is an Indian,' 9 and particularly where only Indians
are parties to the case.20 The state courts have jurisdiction over
other disputes only if state jurisdiction will not infringe on tribal
self-government, 2' and if such jurisdiction is not preempted by
the tribe 22 or the federal government.23 As a general rule then, the
state has jurisdiction over cases involving only non-Indians, 2
cases arising off the reservation,25 or cases over which Congress
has authorized state jurisdiction. 26
Several issues remain unresolved. Most important is the ques-
tion of whether the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over an action
arising on the reservation where an Indian is the plaintiff and the
defendant is a non-Indian. While it is clear that the tribe has
jurisdiction over both the subject and the parties,27 it is not so
clear that its jurisdiction is exclusive.28 Several other issues arise
as practical results of the Supreme Court decisions. For example,
the question of whether Indian court judgments are entitled to
full faith and credit remains open.29 In a like vein, there is no
16. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976). Adopted in 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act in-
troduced broad reforms in Indian policy, the most important of which was the revitaliza-
tion of tribal governments.
17. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
18. See notes 15 supra. See also Barsh, The Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe
and the Future of Tribal Self-Government, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1977).
19. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
20. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
21. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
22. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
23. Congress can preempt any subject matter relating to Indians. Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380
U.S. 685 (1965).
24. Compare New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
25. Compare Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
26. Eg., civil and criminal cases under Public Law 280.
27. Compare Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
28. There is no Supreme Court case that so holds.
29. The Supreme Court has recognized, in dicta, that "Judgments of tribal courts,
as to matters properly within their jurisdiction, have been regarded in some circumstances
as entitled to full faith and credit in other courts." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
19801
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clear agreement as to the power of the state to enforce a judg-
ment or serve process against an Indian who resides on the reser-
vation, even though the state has subject matter jurisdiction to
determine liability.3" These and other issues will be analyzed in
detail in the following sections.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear a
particular kind of case. State courts are often courts of general
jurisdiction, meaning that they have the authority to hear any
subject matter that constitutes a cause of action. Even when the
event being sued upon takes place outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of a given state, the state's courts still have subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, with only a few exceptions. 3 Such is
not the case when the event being sued upon takes place in Indian
country. In such cases, the subject matter jurisdiction of the state
is often defeated and tribal courts become the exclusive forum for
adjudication. While this holds true for all kinds of actions, it is
useful to analyze different types of actions separately so that the
considerations important in each may be understood in their
proper context.
Torts and Contracts. Torts and contracts are generally con-
sidered to be "transitory" actions, meaning that they can be sued
upon in any court having jurisdiction over the parties." Such is
not always the case when the tort is committed or the contract
entered into on the reservation. Tribal jurisdiction is often ex-
clusive, even where no other government could claim exclusive
jurisdiction over such a case. 3
This is clearly true when the case involves only Indians and the
action arises on the reservation. In Williams v. Lee, only the
defendant was an Indian, yet the jurisdiction of the tribal court
U.S. 49, 65 n.21 (1978). Still, there is no clear holding to that effect. But cf., Mackey v.
Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855).
30. Compare Little Horn State Bank v. Stops, 170 Mont. 510, 555 P.2d 211 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977), with Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133
(D.S.D. 1971).
31. The exceptions are so-called "local" actions, which relate to the ownership and
possession of real property. Only the state in which the land is located has jurisdiction
over such actions. H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLIcr OF LAWS 177-78 (4th ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as GOODRICH & SCOLES].
32. Id.
33. Assuming that the Arizona court could acquire personal jurisdiction, it would
have subject matter jurisdiction over a contract made anywhere in the world, except in In-




was found to be exclusive. The Williams Court reviewed the
history of Indian immunity from state law, noting first the doc-
trine of Worcester v. Georgia.4 Worcester held that because In-
dian tribes were distinct and independent political entities,3" the
conduct of relations -with the Indians was left solely to the federal
government.36 State law was, therefore, "of no force" on the
reservation.37
The Williams Court then pointed out that the Worcester doc-
trine had undergone considerable modification over the years,
"in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and
where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized." 3 The
Court then laid the modern test for resolving questions of state
jurisdiction over reservation activities: "Essentially, absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation In-
dians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 3 9
The acts of Congress that concerned the Williams Court were
the Indian Reorganization Act 0 and Public Law 280.41 Neither
law supported the exercise of state jurisdiction. The Indian
Reorganization Act involved a broad program of reforms in In-
dian policy that were based on the notion that tribal governments
should be revitalized and allowed to exercise fully and freely their
powers of self-government. Public Law 280 allowed states to
assume both criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian reserva-
tions. 2 However, since the Navajo Tribe was exercising its
powers of self-government, and the state had not adopted juris-
diction pursuant to Public Law 280, neither statute supported the
argument for state jLirisdiction. 3
Because there were no "governing Acts of Congress," the
34. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
35. Id. at 558.
36. Id. at 561.
37. Id.
38. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
39. Id. at 220.
40. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976).
42. Five states, California, Oregon, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, were
granted jurisdiction in the Act. The rest of the states were given the option of assuming
jurisdiction by legislation. Id. See also Washington v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
43. The Court pointed out that Arizona may have declined to accept Public Law 280
jurisdiction "because the people of the state anticipate that the burdens accompanying
such power might be considerable." 358 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1959).
19801
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Court turned to the question of whether state jurisdiction in such
a case would infringe on tribal self-government. The Court made
its finding clear:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state
jurisdiction in this case would undermine the authority of tribal
courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on
the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial
that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation
and the transaction with an Indian took place there .... The
cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of
Indian governments over their reservation."
Clearly, any time an action arises on the reservation and the
defendant is an Indian, the jurisdiction of the tribal court is ex-
clusive.
Simple though that rule may seem, there are traps for the un-
wary. Williams involved the simplest of all situations-a contract
entered into and to be performed on the reservation. Suppose in-
stead that the contract had been signed on the reservation, but
was to be performed off the reservation. Where is the situs of the
contract? Turning to torts, suppose an Indian committed a
negligent act on a reservation that resulted in injury off the reser-
vation. Where is the situs of the tort? Conflict of law principles
suggest that the courts of both the state in which the contract is
made (or the negligent act committed) and the state in which per-
formance is to take place (or injury results) have jurisdiction to
hear the case."5 However, we know from Williams that the
jurisdiction of tribal courts is often exclusive even where a state's
jurisdiction would not be.
While there is no definitive answer to the question, considera-
tion of the interests the Williams Court found important indicates
that the jurisdiction that was the site of the Indian defendant's
conduct will have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, if an
Indian signs a contract on the reservation, an action arising from
the contract in which the Indian was the defendant would be
heard only in tribal court."6 However, if the Indian signed the
contract off the reservation, state courts have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear any case arising from the contract.47 A similar
44. Id. at 223.
45. GOODRICH & SCOLFS, supra note 31, at 177-78, 198-202; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2), Comment e (1971).
46. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).




result would be reached in a tort action. If the Indian tortfeasor's
conduct takes place on the reservation, the tribal court has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the subject matter.4" Even if the conduct
results in off-reservation injury, the jurisdiction of the trial court
is still exclusive because to allow a state court to pass judgment
on an Indian's on-reservation conduct would plainly "infringe on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them." ''
Clearly, the jurisdiction of the tribal court is exclusive where
the defendant is an Indian and the cause of action arises on the
reservation. This, however, assumes that the tribe has asserted
jurisdiction. This assumption may be critical. It has not yet been
squarely decided by the Supreme Court whether exclusive tribal
jurisdiction depends upon the tribe asserting its power. While
most tribes have courts, some do not, and many of those that do
will not hear certain kinds of cases." This can and has resulted in
plaintiffs losing their remedy solely because the cause of action
arose in Indian country."1 Still, the better arguments favor the
view that the tribe need not actually be willing to hear a certain
case before its jurisdiction over the subject matter is exclusive. As
a legal matter, there is no suitable theory explaining from whence
a state could derive authority, even when there is no tribal
court.2 The nonexistence of tribal courts does not serve as an af-
firmative grant of power to the states. Kennerly says that such an
affirmative grant of jurisdiction is necessary before the state can
assert jurisdiction.53
As a matter of policy, that a legitimate plaintiff may lose his
remedy does not outweigh the tribes' right to make or not to
make certain laws, to provide or not to provide certain remedies.
That a tribe does not hear certain causes of action may be the
result of a policy decision by the tribe, or it may be that the par-
ticular situation is so infrequent on the reservation that there has
been no need to recognize such an action. In either case, it is as
much an exercise of self-government to refuse to hear certain
48. Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974); Valdez v. Johnson, 68
N.M. 476, 362 P.2d 1004 (1961); Gorneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973); Smith
v. Temple, 82 S.D. 650, 152 N.W.2d 547 (1967).
49. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
50. Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 206
[hereinafter cited as Canby].
51. See, e.g., Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974).
52. Since Worcester v. Georgia, the Court has never allowed state courts to assert
jurisdiction over Indians in the absence of a specific congressional grant of such power.
53. 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971).
1980]
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cases as it is to hear them.5 ' State courts often refuse to hear ac-
tions which the courts of another state would hear. This is the
source from which the entire field of conflict of laws comes.
Given the relatively small number of cases that are brought in
tribal courts, the danger of denying a legitimate plaintiff his day
in court is remote and more than justified by the policy of
strengthening tribal self-government.
The question of jurisdiction becomes more complicated when
the defendant is a non-Indian and the plaintiff is an Indian seek-
ing to sue in state court. In such situations, some state courts
have taken a debatable position in favor of state jurisdiction. In
Paiz v. Hughes," a 1966 New Mexico case, the state supreme
court held that the state had jurisdiction over a tort committed on
the reservation, with the Indian as plaintiff and a non-Indian as
the defendant. The plaintiff brought the action in state court
because the tribal court would not hear cases where non-Indians
were the defendants. The court reasoned that state courts must be
open to Indian plaintiffs as a matter of equal protection, at least
where no important tribal or federal interests were at stake. The
court said that the cause of action accrued to the individual In-
dian and was solely an individual matter in which the tribe and
the federal government had no interest. The fact that it was the
Indian who had invoked the jurisdiction of the state court was
significant in the view of the court. 6
There are several obvious weaknesses in the Paiz analysis.
While it is true that Indians may sue and be sued in state court
like other persons,57 when the cause of action arises on the reser-
vation that is not always the case. The special political status of
Indians is clearly a matter of concern to both the tribal and
federal governments. The equal protection argument of the court
was rejected by the Supreme Court in the later case of Fisher v.
District Court" and is no longer a meaningful consideration. Fur-
54. See Chino v. Chino. 90 N.M. 204, 206, 561 P.2d 476, 479 (1977): "For a state to
move into areas where Indian law and procedure have not achieved the degree of certainty
of state law and procedure would deny the Indians the opportunity of developing their
own system."
55. 76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966).
56. The tribe did not accept cases involving non-Indians.
57. See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S.
317, 332 (1892).
58. "The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the race of
the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe




ther, the court in Paiz completely ignores the interest of the tribe
in having its courts apply its law in cases arising in its territory
and involving its members.5 9 Finally, the fact that an Indian in-
vokes the state court's jurisdiction fails to explain the source of
state power over the case. Recall that the failure of jurisdiction in
terms of subject matter is the existence of tribal authority, not the
mere fact that one party or the other is of the Indian race.
60
While it is true that an Indian could submit to the jurisdiction of
the state court, that serves only to give the state personal jurisdic-
tion. Clearly, the filing of a complaint cannot grant a state
jurisdiction over a subject matter that is otherwise beyond its
jurisdiction.
Kennerly involved an attempt by a tribal council to give the
state jurisdiction. It is obvious that a single Indian cannot grant
the state a power that the tribal council could not. Kennerly,
Williams, and Fisher all see an affirmative grant of power to the
states, such as Public Law 280, as a prerequisite to the exercise of
state jurisdiction over such cases. Since New Mexico did not
assume jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280, the Paiz case
must be regarded as suspect precedent. 6 '
As a matter of policy, it is difficult to see what difference it
should make that the Indian is the plaintiff rather than the defen-
dant. That a cause of action arises on the reservation and in-
volves an Indian gives rise to tribal jurisdiction and explains the
tribe's interest in resolving such disputes. That the Indian is the
one bringing the action in state court does little to lessen the in-
fringement, which occurs anytime the state asserts jurisdiction
over on-reservation activities.
Moreover, that state courts do not apply the substantive law of
the tribe in resolving such disputes only furthers the infringement
on tribal self-government.62 It is clear that if a cause of action
ing an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has access, such disparate treat-
ment is justified because it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by fur-
thering the Congressional policy of Indian self-government." 424 U.S. 382, 390-91
(1976).
59. Recall the language of the Court in Williams v. Lee: "It is immaterial that
respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an In-
dian took place there.... The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority
of Indian governments over their reservations." 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
60. Id. See also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976).
61. This is especially true since both Kennerly and Fisher were decided after Paiz v.
Hughes.
62. See Canby, supra note 50, at 206.
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should arise on the reservation, the substantive law of the tribe
should be applied even if the case is litigated in state courts. 63
Domestic Relations. It may be authoritatively said that
domestic or family cases arising on the reservation and involving
only Indians are within the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts.
Any doubt on this matter was laid to rest in the case of Fisher v.
District Court.64 In Fisher the Supreme Court of Montana ruled
that the state had jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding where
the natural parents and the child were all residents of the North-
ern Cheyenne Reservation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction. The Court noted
that state jurisdiction over such a case would clearly infringe on
tribal self-government, particularly where the subject matter was
one so important to the tribe as child welfare.
The Court also pointed out that there was no affirmative grant
of power to the state from the federal government. This is the key
point in the case. Recall that Kennerly v. District Court6" held
that since the tribe and the state had not followed the procedures
under Public Law 280, the state was without jurisdiction even
though the Blackfoot Tribal Council had clearly attempted to
grant such jurisdiction to the state. The Fisher Court, applying
the rule from Kennerly, found that the state had no jurisdiction.
Another important point was that the tribe was able to preempt
state jurisdiction by asserting its powers of self-government pur-
suant to the Indian Reorganization Act. Montana had argued
that in times previous to the tribe's reorganization, the state had
asserted jurisdiction over such cases. Without passing on the
question of whether the exercise of such jurisdiction had been
legal, the Court said that even if it was, the tribe had since
preempted the subject matter.66
While the field of Indian child welfare has now been preemp-
ted by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, the cases on child
custody before the passage of that act are enlightening and will be
63. See GOODRICH & SCOLES, supra note 31, at 165; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 6, Comments c, d, f, g, and i (1971).
64. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
65. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
66. "The tribal ordinance conferring jurisdiction on the Tribal Court was authorized
by § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476. Consequently, it implements
an overriding federal policy which is clearly adequate to defeat state jurisdiction over
litigation involving reservation Indians. Accordingly, even if we assume that the Montana
courts properly exercised adoption jurisdiction prior to the organization of the Tribe, a





discussed below. Their precedential value is, of course, extremely
limited, but they are instructive applications of the jurisdictional
doctrines that are the subject of this note.
Child Welfare. In the area of child custody and welfare, state
courts have consistently acknowledged exclusive tribal jurisdic-
tion where the parents are Indians and the child is domiciled on
the reservation. In Wakefield v. Little Light,67 a Crow Tribal
Court had awarded temporary custody of a neglected Indian
child to a non-Indian couple. The couple eventually took the
child With them to Maryland, where they petitioned the state
court for an adoption decree naming them as parents of the child.
Meanwhile, the natural mother of the child had petitioned the
Crow Tribal Court for custody of her child. The Maryland Court
of Appeals ruled that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction
over the case.68 The court reasoned that the Crow court had con-
tinuing jurisdiction over the child and had the power to order the
foster parents to return the child.69 Further, the court believed
that the jurisdiction of the Crow Tribal Court was entitled to the
same deference as that of a sister state.7" The Wakefield court
recognized that under normal conflict of laws principles it could
assert jurisdiction over the subject matter based on the presence
of the child within the state.71 However, the original and continu-
ing jurisdiction of the Crow Tribal Court was seen to oust the
state from exercising jurisdiction.72
An extremely principled and enlightened use of standard con-
flict of laws analyses in the context of Indian child welfare is
found in the case of Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston." In
that case, the Indian grandfather of a child whose parents had
died in a tragic murder-suicide petitioned the federal district court
for an order releasing the child from custody of custodians
named in a state court action. The grandfather based his claim on
the theory that, even though the tribe did not have a formal tribal
court to hear the case, tribal customary law dictated that the child
be taken in by the grandfather. State jurisdiction over the case
was found to be infringement, even though it was the Indian who
67. 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1975).
68. Id., 347 A.2d at 237-38.
69. Id. at 237.
70. See also In re Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22, Comment h (1971); 347
A.2d 228, 237 (Ct. App. 1975).
72. 347 A.2d at 238.
73. 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
1980]
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had invoked the power of the state court.7" The federal court
looked only to the question of where the child was domiciled in
determining the issue. Using a straightforward conflict of laws
analysis, the court found that the child was domiciled on the
reservation and that tribal law applied.7 Considerable testimony
concerning the customary law of the tribe was presented, and the
court found that tribal custom would grant custody to the grand-
father.
The Houston case is interesting for a variety of reasons. First,
note that the domicile of the child was the controlling factor in
the case. Second, the court employed normal conflict of laws
principles in determining domicile. Third, tribal jurisdiction and
its exclusivity was upheld even where there was no formal tribal
court. Fourth, it was tribal customary law, not codified written
law, which was chosen and applied in the case. This approach is
important because many state courts would undoubtedly use the
fact that there was no tribal court or code to support a finding of
no infringement on tribal self-government and justify state
jurisdiction over such a case.
Divorce. The current law on jurisdiction over divorce actions
involving Indians is unnecessarily confused. Because there is no
Supreme Court precedent, the state courts have been deciding the
issue with confusing and incorrect results. One of the earliest
cases is Tenorio v. Tenorio,76 a 1940 New Mexico decision
holding that the state court had jurisdiction to grant a divorce to
two Indian residents of the Santo Domingo Pueblo. The court
reasoned that the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico were not in-
dependent political communities as the Cherokees of Georgia had
been."
The first case decided after the decision in Williams v. Lee was
74. "To petition the state court to voluntarily grant him custody of the children was
rational, given his interest in the children. In so doing, he submitted himself to the per-
sonal jurisdiction of the court as to that case. But the actions of an individual person,
even if in accord with custom, cannot create subject matter jurisdiction over Indian af-
fairs in state court." Id. at 733.
75. The court noted that jurisdiction over child custody matters is determined by the
domicile of the child, and that the child's domicile was that of the parent with whom he
lived. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLicr OF LAWS § 313 (1971). The mother had moved
off the reservation and taken the children with her, but because she had not established a
new domicile, both her domicile and that of the children remained on the reservation. Id.
at § 15; 393 F. Supp. 719, 732 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
76. 44 N.M. 89, 98 P.2d 838 (1940).




Whyte v. District Court."8 The Colorado Supreme Court there
held that the state had no jurisdiction over a divorce action be-
tween two Indians residing on the Ute Mountain Reservation.
The court applied the Williams test, finding that state jurisdiction
would clearly be infringement. Of more interest, though, the
court said that the test for resolving the question where only In-
dians were involved "is not whether a state has disclaimed
jurisdiction, but whether Congress has authorized such jurisdic-
tion within the state."" In light of the holdings in Kennerly and
Fisher, the Colorado court's formulation of the test appears to be
correct. 0
Still, some states, notably Montana, purport to have jurisdic-
tion over such cases. In Bad Horse v. Bad Horse,II the Montana
Supreme Court held that the state courts had jurisdiction to grant
a divorce between two Indians, each residing on their respective
reservations.8 2 The court advanced two theories in finding that
the holdings in Williams and Kennerly were not controlling. The
first was frivolous. The court argued that because the marriage
ceremony itself was conducted off the reservation and within the
state, the state courts had jurisdiction. 3 More interesting was the
infringement analysis. The court pointed out that in 1937 the
tribe had passed an ordinance requiring all Indian marriages to be
performed in compliance with Montana law, and that since that
time the tribal courts had not exercised jurisdiction over divorces.
The ordinance itself is irrelevant, 4 but the failure of the tribal
courts to hear such actions supports Montana's argument that
state jurisdiction in such a case would not infringe on tribal self-
government. 5
78. 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960).
79. Id., 346 P.2d at 1015.
80. Compare Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145
(1973).
81. 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893 (1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 847 (1974).
82. The plaintiff-husband was a resident of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, and
the defendant-wife and her child were residents of the Fort Bethold Reservation.
83. Quite obviously, the fact that a marriage takes place in a state has little bearing
on the question of jurisdiction to grant a divorce. Divorce jurisdiction is based on the
presence of one or more of the parties in the jurisdiction. GOODRICH & SCOLES, supra note
31, at 255; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ 71-72 (1971).
84. The ordinance simply stated that Indian marriages would be in compliance with
Montana law. This section is standard in tribal codes and can be found at 25 C.F.R. §
11.27 (1980). It can hardly be read as a grant of divorce jurisdiction to the state.
85. See Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966).
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It is not clear that there is no infringement in such a case. Sup-
pose that the tribe simply opposes divorce as a matter of policy,
as does every government, and that this tribal policy is so strong
that the tribe had simply closed the courthouse doors to such ac-
tions. It is a clear undercutting of tribal policy for the state to
then grant the divorce. Furthermore, such an assertion of statejurisdiction tends to deprive the tribe of the opportunity to adapt
the law to its beliefs: "Indian customs and traditions may dictate
different approaches than that which the state may use. For a
state to move into areas where Indian law and procedure have not
achieved the degree of certainty of state law and procedure would
deny the Indians the opportunity of developing their own
system."' 6 It is obvious that for state courts to assume jurisdic-
tion over actions not recognized by tribal law is to "infringe on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
governed by them."' 7
Again, there are elementary conflict of laws principles that
provide solutions to several problems. Generally, the state should
take jurisdiction over Indian divorces only when one party is
domiciled off the reservation." Even then, only if both parties
are domiciled off the reservation should the court make a proper-
ty settlement and set alimony.' 9 On the other side of the reserva-
tion boundary, Indian tribes must modernize their codes to serve
their members who seek divorce, or at least make firm policy pro-
nouncements on the subject one way or the other. However, it is
clear that unless tribal courts will assert their power over all cases
within the reservation, they are inviting the type of interference
which the Bad Horse case represents.'
Real Property Actions. Actions directly affecting title to or
possession of real property are considered to be "local" actions,
meaning that they can only be brought in the state within whose
territory the land is located." While there is a paucity of law on
the subject, the same is apparently true when the land in question
is located in Indian country.
86. Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 204, 206, 561 P.2d 476, 479 (1977).
87. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
88. See note 83 supra.
89. Such orders require that the court have personal jurisdiction over both of the
parties. GOODRICH & SCOLES, supra note 31, at 276. As will be seen infra, states have no
personal jurisdiction over Indians on the reservation in the absence of additional cir-
cumstances justifying state in personam jurisdiction.
90. See Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH L. REv.
206.
91. GOODRICH & SCOLES, supra note 31, at 177-81.
[Vol. 8
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In Chino v. Chino,92 a 1979 New Mexico case, the court held
that the state had no jurisdiction over a forcible entry and de-
tainer action that arose on the Mescalero Apache Reservation and
both of the parties were Indians. The court first noted that the
state had disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian lands in its constitu-
tion. 93 Further, the state had never assumed jurisdiction pursuant
to Public Law 280. "Thus, the treaties and statutes applicable in
this case preclude the state from exercising jurisdiction over prop-
erty lying within reservation boundaries." 94
The court also found that the infringement test defeated state
power."
An action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer deals direct-
ly with the question of occupancy and ownership of land.
When the land lies within a reservation, enforcement of the
owner's rights to such property by the state court would in-
fringe upon the governmental powers of the tribe, whether
those owners are Indians or non-Indians. Civil jurisdiction of
lands within the reservation remains with the tribe. 96
Most interesting is that the court reached this conclusion even
though the Mescalero Tribal Court would not hear the action.
The court recognized that for the state to accept jurisdiction on
the grounds that tribal law did not recognize such a cause of ac-
tion would deny the tribe the opportunity of developing its own
system. 97
While the result in Chino is undoubtedly correct, the court may
have overstated its argument. It is not clear that all property ac-
tions arising within the reservation are under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the tribes. For instance, in a dispute between two
non-Indians, the state may have a sufficient governmental in-
terest to assert jurisdiction.98 However, the standard conflict of
laws rule is that jurisdiction over such cases is exclusively within
92. 90 N.M. 204, 561 P.2d 476 (1977).
93. N.M. CONST. art. 21, § 2.
94. 90 N.M. 204, 206, 561 P.2d 476, 479 (1977).
95. The court found three factors to be generally relevant in applying the infringe-
ment test: (1) The race of the parties, (2) whether the action arises from events on or off
the reservation, and (3) the nature of the tribal interest at stake. Id. at 206, 561 P.2d at
479.
96. Id.
97. See note 54 supra.
98. Compare Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976);
New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
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the "state" 99 in which the property is located. 00 Therefore, tribal
jurisdiction may well be exclusive, particularly where the tribe can
point to a particular and legitimate governmental interest which
would be jeopardized by an assertion of state jurisdiction. '0 '
Probate."0 2 When a person dies, the state in which he dies
domiciled has jurisdiction to probate the estate. When the dece-
dent is an Indian resident of the reservation, it is clear that the
tribe should have exclusive jurisdiction over his estate. 03 More
difficult problems arise when the decedent is a non-Indian resi-
dent of the reservation. Both the state and the tribe can fairly
assert an interest in the estate in that both can claim that the
decedent was a resident within their territory.'04 In such a case,
unless there is some important tribal interest at stake, 05 there is
reason to allow the state courts to probate the estate. The
jurisdiction should be concurrent in such a case, giving the person
bringing the suit a choice as to which forum will hear the case.
The major difficulty in this area is that many tribal courts will
not hear cases involving non-Indians.' 6 To the extent that the
tribes fail to exercise their authority over such estates, it is clear
that they are inviting the state to assert its power. Thus, the onus
is on the tribes. If they assert their power, their right to do so will
be protected. If they do not, their complaints as to state infringe-
ment probably will, and in this special area should, fall on deaf
ears. 107
99. "State" is defined at section 3 of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1971) as: "a territorial unit with a distinct body of law." See also id., Comments c & e.
Indian governments would clearly come within this broad definition.
100. GOODRICH & ScoLES, supra note 31, at 177-81.
101. For intance, if the tribe had adopted a comprehensive zoning or housing code, it
would have a clear and legitimate interest in the outcome of a suit disputing ownership or
possession of real estate within the reservation.
102. Because of the complexities of probate of Indian trust property, this note will
deal only with issues regarding nontrust property. See Comment, Too Little Land, Too
Many Heirs-The Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 WASH. L. REV. 709 (1971).
103. GOODRICH & SCOLES, supra note 31, at 340-43.
104. While the reservation boundary is effectively a barrier blocking state power over
Indians, the state is not blocked from affecting non-Indians on the reservation. Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
105. For example, the decedent's spouse could well be an Indian resident of the reser-
vation. In such a case, the tribe would have a clear interest in guaranteeing the spouse's
future economic security.
106. See Canby, supra note 50.
107. Probate, like death and taxes, is inevitable. It would be different if the action did
not have to be brought. However, the death of a person requires a series of legal steps be




Cases Arising Off the Reservation
In many cases involving Indians as parties, state courts are
found to have subject matter jurisdiction based on the fact that
the cause of action arose from events taking place off the reserva-
tion. In Little Horn State Bank v. Stops,' °8 the Montana
Supreme Court found that the state courts had subject matter
jurisdiction over a contract action between an Indian and a non-
Indian. The transaction had taken. place off the reservation. This,
and the tribal court not taking jurisdiction over the case, led the
court to find that the state had jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter. 109
In the area of domestic relations, the on-reservation off-
reservation distinction is equally important. A 1972 Montana
case, In re Cantrell, demonstrates the importance of the distinc-
tion."10 In Cantrell, the child was originally a domiciliary of the
reservation where the parents resided. The child was found aban-
doned off the reservation and spent about a year in an off-
reservatioif foster home. The natural mother made no attempt to
have the child returned to her during this time. The tribal court
had previously taken the child from its mother for a time, but
had returned the child to her before the abandonment occurred.
The Montana court included no analysis of whether the jurisdic-
tion of the tribal court was continuing, and no analysis of the
domicile of the child.
In Adoption of Doe,"' a 1976 New Mexico case, the court
found that the state courts had jurisdiction over Indian child
custody where the natural mother places the child for adoption in
the state courts. In Doe, the mother was a Navajo Indian living
off-reservation in a town bordering the reservation. The child's
Navajo grandfather had argued in state court that the tribe had
exclusive jurisdiction over the child. The court noted that the
child and his mother were not reservation residents, and that they
had few contacts with the reservation. While the tribal court may
have had jurisdiction over the child, the court in Doe held that
the off-reservation residence of the child was sufficient to give the
state at least concurrent jurisdiction over the case.
forum, the needs of the decedent's heirs dictate that the state provide one.
108. 170 Mont. 510, 555 P.2d 211 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
109. The court was correct in this finding, but went on to hold that the state could en-
force its judgment by executing on property owned by an Indian and located on the reser-
vation. This holding is examined supra in the first part of this note.
110. 159 Mont. 66, 495 P.2d 179 (1972).
111. 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1976).
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These cases make it plain that when Indians leave the reserva-
tion, they are subject to the same laws as any other person within
the state. This is the clear teaching of many Supreme Court cases
as well as those noted above.
Summary
The subject matter jurisdiction of state courts and tribal courts
is fairly clear, although there is.no unanimity in the cases on some
questions. If a case arises on the reservation and involves only In-
dians, the state has no jurisdiction, assuming Public Law 280
jurisdiction has not been assumed. When both Indians and non-
Indians are involved, the situs of the Indian party's conduct
should be controlling. If the Indian was on the reservation, tribal
jurisdiction is exclusive. If the Indian acted off the reservation,
the subject matter jurisdiction of the state and the tribe is concur-
rent.
This discussion has assumed that the court having subject mat-
ter jurisdiction also has jurisdiction over the parties.bAs will be
seen in the following section, such is not always the case.
Personal Jurisdiction
Even after it has been determined that one or more govern-
ments have subject matter jurisdiction over a case, the issue of
personal jurisdiction must still be resolved. Often a state court
can have subject matter jurisdiction, as when a case arises off the
reservation, and still not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant if he is an Indian residing on the reservation. This
anomaly has resulted in a number of poorly reasoned and prob-
ably incorrect decisions in state courts, which will be discussed in-
fra. Note also that even though a state court may have jurisdic-
tion over an Indian for purposes of determining liability, it may
not have jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing the judgment
against a reservation resident by executing on property located on
the reservation.
Jurisdiction over Non-Indians
When it comes to non-Indians on the reservation, tribal and
state courts both have jurisdiction over the person.' 12 Tribal
112. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the
reservation); Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145 (1800) (state jurisdiction over non-




authority comes from the residual sovereignty of Indian tribes,
part of that sovereignty being the power to regulate the conduct
of persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the tribe. State
jurisdiction derives from the fact that reservations are located
within the state's boundaries, and its residents are state
citizens. 1 3 Further, non-Indians do not have the same special
relationship with the federal and tribal governments that Indians
enjoy."' This section will look at the development of these rules,
discuss recent decisions, and point out problems which are as yet
unresolved.
The key problems in this area are easily solved. Most problems
occur when a court has jurisdiction to render a judgment but
does not have the authority to enforce the judgment." ' Most
often, this situation arises when an Indian incurs liability off the
reservation and returns to the reservation where he is beyond the
reach of state law. The opposite situation is where the non-Indian
incurs liability while on the reservation and then leaves with no
intent to return. In both situations, the easy answer is to allow
the judgment to be enforced in the court having personal jurisdic-
tion by giving the judgment full faith and credit or comity treat-
ment.' 1 6 It is clear that neither the Indian nor the non-Indian
should be able to use the reservation boundary as a buffer against
payment of liabilities.
Another problem arises where a tribal court renders a judg-
ment against a non-Indian reservation resident who simply
refuses to acknowledge tribal authority over him. Refusal to pay
a judgment could probably result in a civil contempt proceeding
against an Indian, but a recent Supreme Court decision renders
doubtful the power of a tribe to use such a proceeding against a
non-Indian."' This leaves the tribal court with the single option
113. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); New York
ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
114. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); New York
ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
115. See Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971).
116. Full faith and credit and comity are related doctrines. Full faith and credit
derives from the U.S. Constitution, art. 4, § 1. Comity is a common law doctrine deriving
from the notion that nations should respect the law of other nations over matters properly
within the other nation's jurisdiction. See Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full
Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REv. 133 (1977).
117. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), where the Court
ruled that Indian tribes have no authority to try criminal charges against non-Indians,
based on the notion that the liberty interest of American citizens renders criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.
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of sending tribal police officers to execute against the
non-Indian's property, which could be a tense and potentially
violent situation, particularly where the non-Indian doubts the
authority of the tribe.
Despite these problems, the law is clear. When a non-Indian in-
curs liability on the reservation, assuming that he can be served
with process either on the reservation or pursuant to a tribal long-
arm statute, he is clearly subject to the personal jurisdiction of
the tribe." 8 So long as state courts grant tribal court judgments
full faith and credit, there are no insurmountable problems in this
area.
The law on full faith and credit for Indian court judgments is
not clear, although most states have begun to acknowledge that
tribal judgments are entitled to such treatment. ' 9 In In re Estate
of Lynch,12 there was a will contest brought in state court in
Arizona. The will had previously been probated in Navajo Tribal
Court before the initiation of the state court action. The court
recognized that tribal jurisdiction was often exclusive, and con-
cluded that "the proceedings held in the Navajo Tribal Court
must be treated the same as proceedings in a court of another
state or country .. ." The court did not go so far as to say
that the tribal judgment was entitled to constitutional full faith
and credit,' 22 but its decision implies as much.
Some courts have been more direct. In Jim v. C.I. T. Financial
Services Corp., '23 the New Mexico Supreme Court found that
tribal court judgments were entitled to full faith and credit
because 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (the statute implementing the full faith
and credit clause) requires that full faith and credit be extended
to the courts of a "territory." The Navajo Tribe, according to
the court, is a "territory" within the meaning of the statute. This
less than satisfactory approach was followed without comment in
Adoption of Buehl, 24 a 1976 Washington case.'21
118. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) makes clear that tribes have authority over
persons committing liability-producing acts on the reservation.
119. See Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian
Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REv. 133 (1977).
120. 92 Ariz 354, 377 P.2d 199 (1962).
121. Id., 377 P.2d at 201.
122. As opposed to the common law notion of comity.
123. 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).
124. 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976).
125. For a critique of the result in Jim, see Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of




Other courts have refined the rationale in searching for
grounds to reach the practical and proper result that Indian court
judgments are binding on state courts. In Red Fox v. Red Fox,'26
the Oregon Court of Appeals dealt with a divorce decree issued
by a tribal court. The court discussed the Indian sovereignty doc-
trine and concluded that:
[W]hile the decisions of tribal courts are not.., entitled to the
same "full faith and credit" accorded decrees of sister states,
the quasi-sovereign nature of the tribe does suggest that
judgments rendered by tribal courts are entitled to the same
deference shown decisions of foreign nations as a matter of
comity. 2
The court discussed the requirements of comity and found that
the tribal court judgment met them all. 121 This approach is
sound. It recognizes that Indian court jurisdiction is often ex-
clusive, and the integrity of these judgments being given comity
treatment is guaranteed by the analysis employed by the Oregon
court. Further, given that the Indian Civil Rights Act' 2 requires
that tribal courts accord due process and equal protection, Indian
tribal court judgments should be presumed to meet the re-
quirements of comity because these are little more than the basics
of notice and opportunity to be heard. Still, there is need for a
statement from the Supreme Court on this issue. Only that will
settle the problem.
Jurisdiction over Indians
Jurisdiction over Indians on the reservation has been the
source of much disagreement among state courts, when in fact it
is a simple situation to analyze. There is no question that tribal
courts have jurisdiction over Indians on the reservation.130 States,
on the other hand, have no inherent authority over Indians on the
reservation. This has been the law from the early days of the
126. 23 Or. App. 393, 542 P.2d 918 (1975).
127. Id., 542 P.2d at 920.
128. The four requirements listed by the court were: (1) that the foreign court have
had jurisdiction, (2) that the decree not be obtained fraudulently, (3) that the foreign
court reasonably assures the requisites of impartial administration of justice, and (4) that
the judgment not contravene the public policy of the state in which it is relied upon.
These are the standard requirements found in the conflict of laws rules of most states. 542
P.2d at 922.
129. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976).
130. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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Republic. The Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1 ' Worcester v.
Georgia,32 and Public Law 280133 all point to the inescapable
conclusion that state law cannot reach Indians on the reservation
absent a specific grant of such authority from Congress. Still,
many state courts have misperceived the issue and asserted
jurisdiction over Indians on the reservation.
Thus, in Natewa v. Natewa,34 a New Mexico court held that
the state had jurisdiction to enforce a child support order against
an Indian resident of the Zuni Pueblo which had been issued in
Wisconsin. While there was no question that the Wisconsin court
had jurisdiction to issue the order, it was not so clear that New
Mexico could enforce the judgment. The court reasoned that
since the Zuni Tribal Court would not enforce the obligation,
there would be no infringement if the state court enforced it. The
court also said that unless Congress had expressly granted or
reserved such authority to the Indians, the state had jurisdiction.
This is plainly incorrect. 35 However, it is clear that if the Zuni
court had been willing to hear the case, a different result may well
have resulted.
Similarly, in State Securities v. Anderson,'36 a 1973 New Mex-
ico case, the court held that the state had authority to serve proc-
ess on an Indian on the reservation in an action over a contract
dispute arising off the reservation. The court applied the same
misstatement found in the Natewa case, that unless Congress had
forbade the state from exercising jurisdiction, it could do so. The
court went on to say that the jurisdiction of the state and the
tribe in such cases was concurrent, and therefore no infringement
on tribal self-government would result from state jurisdiction.
The correct view on the question may be found in Annis v.
Dewey County Bank.'37 The court there held that the state court
had no authority to enforce a judgment against an Indian on the
reservation. The court noted that although the cause of action
arose off the reservation, and the state court therefore had sub-ject matter jurisdiction, the judgment would still have to be en-
forced on the reservation. Because the state had not adopted
Public Law 280 jurisdiction, it simply had no authority over In-
131. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976).
132. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1160, 25 U.S.C. 1320 (1976).
134. 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691 (1972).
135. Williams, Fisher and Kennerly all necessarily reject this view.
136. 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973).




dians on the reservation. The court argued that the state did not
even have the authority to serve process on an Indian on the
reservation. An interesting point is that the court in this case, in
applying the Williams test, ruled that Public Law 280 was a
"governing Act of Congress," and the failure of the state to
comply with the statute rendered it completely without authority
to enforce judgments on the reservation against Indians.
Similarly, in Francisco v. State,'38 the Arizona Supreme Court
held that the state courts had no jurisdiction over reservation In-
dians. The case involved a paternity suit, and the court found
that the state did have subject matter jurisdiction because concep-
tion had occurred off the reservation. However, the court
recognized that state court jurisdiction over reservation Indians
hinged on the degree to which Congress had authorized state jur-
isdiction. As the state had not adopted Public Law 280 jurisdic-
tion, the state had no jurisdiction over the Indian on the reserva-
tion.
While the issue of personal jurisdiction over reservation In-
dians is not fully resolved, it is clear that the better arguments
favor the view that state courts have no jurisdiction over such
persons. As in the area of recognition of tribal judgments in state
court, a healthy dose of mutual respect between tribal and state
governments can clearly solve the practical difficulties that might
result from a finding of no state jurisdiction. First of all, the
tribes should adopt procedures for the service of state court proc-
ess on reservation Indians where the Indian has incurred off-
reservation liability. Similarly, the states should adopt long-arm
statutes for service of process on reservation Indians."'3 Once ser-
vice of process has been accomplished, the state has jurisdiction
for the purpose of determining the Indian defendant's liability.
Once that determination has been made, the judgment should
be brought to the tribal court for enforcement where necessary.
Any other procedure would clearly infringe on tribal self-
government, particularly where the tribe has laws relating to such
enforcement that differ from the law of the state rendering the
original judgment. If the tribe should refuse to enforce the judg-
ment, the state can retaliate in a number of ways. It might refuse
to grant full faith and credit to tribal judgments. It could refuse
138. 113 Ariz. 427, 556 P.2d 1 (1976).
139. Of course, such a statute would not serve to give the state anything unless there
was complete compliance with the terms of Public Law 280. Kennerly v. District Court,
400 U.S. 423 (1971).
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to serve process rendered by Indian tribal courts. It could even
refuse to hear cases arising on the reservation when brought by
Indian plaintiffs. The decision would be the tribes'. They can
either join the family of governments that recognize and enforce
valid process and judgments from the courts of another, or they
can cut themselves off from the benefits of such cooperation,
thereby inviting state court interference in their affairs.
Summary and Comment
Unlike the areas of criminal and taxation jurisdiction, jurisdic-
tion over private civil disputes arising in Indian country is clear.
This gives both tribal and state governments the opportunity to
make policy free from the uncertainties that plague so many areas
of Indian law.
The tribes have several tasks to accomplish. The first and most
important is comprehensive revision of antiquated and in-
complete tribal codes. The tribes must amend their codes to ac-
cept jurisdiction over cases involving non-Indians without the
consent of the parties. Failure to do so will result in either the
case being heard in state court or a loss of remedy for legitimate
plaintiffs. Clearly, neither result is desirable. The tribes must also
expand their codes to cover the range of actions available under
state law. This does not mean that they must recognize every
cause of action the state does. Self-government would be mean-
ingless if the tribes simply adopt in toto the law of the states.
However, the tribes should make it clear that their failure is the
result of a considered policy decision and not mere oversight. In
that way, they make it clear that for the state to hear a cause of
action arising on the reservation and involving Indians would in-
fringe on tribal self-government.
Both the states and the tribes must develop clear guidelines for
the recognition of judgments rendered by the courts of the other.
Unless both are willing to recognize the governmental integrity of
the other, and begin enforcing the judgments of each other as a
matter of course, the reservation boundary will become a shield
for both Indians and non-Indians seeking to escape responsibility
for actionable conduct taking place both within and without the
reservation. It does not matter whether this is done in the name
of comity or in the name of full faith and credit.
State courts must accept the exclusive nature of tribal jurisdic-
tion and develop principles to overcome the practical difficulties
that arise. The hostile and often lawless decisions coming from




ly increases the ill will between state and tribal governments. If
the courts of the states would put their prejudices aside and
employ standard conflict of laws theories developed to resolve
such disputes between states, consistency and certainty in the law
could be achieved.
In short, the tribes and the states have the opportunity to
develop law that will truly serve the interest of both state and
tribal citizens. All that is required is mutual respect and the ex-
pansion and revision of tribal and state laws. If either govern-
ment fails to do its share, the chaos that exists in the area will
continue. The present uncertainty is clearly not in the best interest
of the persons who have suffered injury and are seeking redress
in the courts. The current confusion is wholly unnecessary, par-
ticularly given that conflict of laws principles familiar to all
courts provide easy answers to problems troubling both the tribes
and the states. Not to employ these principles is to miss an ex-
cellent opportunity for tribes and states to work together in pro-
viding a better system of law for Indians and non-Indians alike.
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